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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal from the Order and Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, by the Honorable Pat B. Brian granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants, dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants submit the following undisputed facts to supplement and, in certain cases, 
to counteract the slant put on Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts. 
1. Plaintiffs' Statement of Fact No. 3 (Brief of Appellant, at 5) fails to disclose 
that William Hatton, in his Affidavit (R. 145-146) acknowledges that Hattons and The Travel 
Company were represented by an attorney in negotiating and entering into the Agreement for 
the Purchase and Sale of The Travel Company's Assets ("Purchase Agreement"). 
2. Plaintiffs Statement of Fact No. 7 (Brief of Appellant at 6) sets forth an 
incorrect legal conclusion rather than a statement of fact. The exact language in the 
Purchase Agreement, Section 2(c) is: 
The Deferred Payment shall be evidenced by a promissory note 
substantially in the form of Exhibit "A" attached hereto and 
made part hereof. (R. 28). 
Clearly, by this language, the actual note is not incorporated; instead, the form of the note is 
specified. 
3. In Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts Nos. 13 and 14 (Brief of Appellant, p. 7), 
Plaintiffs are attempting to infer, contrary to the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint referred 
to below, that Plaintiffs were treating the Purchase Agreement and the "Promissory Note" as 
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being current through April 30, 1988: 
a. Paragraphs 33-40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 5-6) speak of Morris' 
claimed adjustment amounting to more than a $200,000 reduction in 
principal due and Plaintiffs' rejection of Morris' claim and calculations. 
b. Paragraphs 43-46 and 80 of Plaintiffs Complaint (R. 8, 13) 
speak of Morris' failure to provide a quarterly accounting and to pay 
any "Earn Out Payments" which it was allegedly obligated to do 
beginning July, 1985. 
c. Paragraphs 53, 54, 55, 57, 60, 64, 65, 89 and 91 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint (R. 9, 10, 11, 14 ) speak of a continuing default on interest 
due and on Defendants' obligation to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 
d. Paragraph 72 of Plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 11) seeks recovery of 
$240,704.38 plus interest from April 30. 1985. 
4. In or about December, 1984, Morris offered to purchase the stock or the 
assets of The Travel Company from the Hattons. Complaint, par. 9. (R. 3). 
5. William Hatton negotiated with Morris the terms of sale of the assets of The 
Travel Company. Complaint, par. 10. (R. 3). 
6. Morris was ordered in William and Wanda Hatton's Decree of Divorce, 
(Appendix 1), par. 10, to tender all future amounts owed under the Morris Note and Morris 
Agreement to The Travel Company, in care of Wanda Hatton's attorneys, Fox, Edwards, 
Gardiner & Brown. (R. 243). 
7. After the break up of the firm of Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown, Morris, 
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by letter from its counsel, Thomas E. Kelly of Holme, Roberts & Owen to William Hatton's 
attorney, Jan C. Graham of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, dated January 5, 1988 
(Appendix 2), expressed the difficulty of not knowing to whom payment should be tendered 
and took the position that it would only tender payment upon joint instruction of Bill and 
Wanda Hatton. (R. 2). 
8. In its January 5, 1988 letter (Appendix 2), Morris reminded Jan C. Graham, 
in response to her demand for payment under the Promissory Note, that the payee under the 
Note was not William Hatton, but The Travel Company. (R. 141-142). 
9. Morris made it clear in its January 5, 1988 letter to Jan C. Graham that it 
intended to promptly pay the entire remaining balance that it believed was owed under the 
Promissory Note. (R. 141-142). 
10. By letter dated January 15, 1988, from Morris' attorney Richie D. Haddock to 
William Hatton's attorney, Janet C. Graham, Morris tendered $84,295.62, the amount it 
asserted in the letter constituted the remaining principal balance due under the Promissory 
Note and $8,196.95, the amount it asserted in the letter constituted the accrued interest on 
the Promissory Note. (R. 111-112). 
11. Plaintiffs acknowledge receipt of a principal payment of $84,295.62 and 
interest payment of $8,647.41 in February, 1988. Complaint, par. 62. (R. 10). 
12. Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, The Travel Company retained its 
accounts receivable existing as of April 28, 1985. Purchase Agreement, par. 14. 
(R. 48). 
13. The Travel Company had ongoing responsibilities and commitments under the 
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terms of the Purchase Agreement. See, e.g. par. 16 Survival of Representations and 
Warranties and par 17 Further Assurances. (R. 50-51). 
14. In an Agreement dated February, 1987 entered into in connection with 
Hatton's divorce settlement (Appendix 3) (the "Divorce Agreement"), by sworn affidavit, 
William Hatton acknowledged The Travel Company as the holder of a note receivable from 
Morris and as the beneficiary of certain provisions in an Agreement for the Purchase and 
Sale of Assets between Morris and The Travel Company. Divorce Agreement, 1 D. 
(R. 210). 
15. In the Divorce Agreement, William Hatton acknowledged the possible 
necessity or advisability of litigating certain provisions of the Promissory Note and the 
Purchase Agreement. Divorce Agreement, 1f E. (R. 210). 
16. In the Divorce Agreement, the "Travel Company Funds" were defined as those 
funds which were originally owed to The Travel Company under the Morris Note or the 
Morris Agreement which had not at that time been distributed to William Hatton or Wanda 
Hatton. Divorce Agreement f 1(b) (R. 210). 
17. In an Assignment dated February, 1987, executed and sworn to by William 
Hatton on February 9, 1987 (the "Divorce Assignment"), (Appendix 4) the Promissory Note 
was acknowledged to have been executed by Morris Travel in favor of The Travel Company. 
Divorce Assignment, 1 1(a). (R. 215). 
18. In the Divorce Assignment, the term "Disputed Installments" was used to refer 
to those installments due under the Promissory Note which Morris disputes, said installments 
falling due beginning on January 31, 1988 and continuing through April 30, 1990 in the total 
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approximate principal amount of $241,000. Divorce Assignment, 1 1(c). (R. 215). The 
Divorce Agreement (Appendix 3) and the Divorce Assignment (Appendix 4) are sometimes 
hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Divorce Settlement Documents." 
19. Depending on the subsequent performance of the accounts purchased by 
Morris from The Travel Company, The Travel Company could have been entitled to 
additional payments or the amount to be paid to The Travel Company by Morris could have 
been reduced. Purchase Agreement, paragraphs 3(a), 4, 4(a)-4(e). (R. 29-32). Promissory 
Note. (R. 54-55). 
20. Pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note (R. 54-55), Morris Travel was 
obligated to make quarterly payments to The Travel Company for specified but adjustable 
amounts; and the Promissory Note expressly authorized prepayment "in whole or part at any 
time without penalty." Complaint, 11 16, 21, 24, 25, and Complaint, Exhibit B. (R. 4, 5 & 
54-55). 
21. Until approximately February 10, 1987, William A. Hatton was the sole 
shareholder of The Travel Company. Complaint, 1 67. (R. 11 ). 
22. On or about February 10, 1987, fifty percent of The Travel Company's stock 
was transferred to Wanda Hatton pursuant to a Decree of Divorce and Judgment (the 
"Decree of Divorce") (Appendix 1) between William and Wanda Hatton. Complaint 11 67-
68. (R. 11). 
23. The June 30, 1988 Complaint (the "1988 Complaint") was commenced by The 
Travel Company to collect the same monies that are the subject of the current action. 
(R. 77-98). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH CORPORATE 
CONTINUANCE STATUTE. 
This case involves a contractual dispute between Morris Travel Express 
Corporation ("Morris") and "The Travel Company," a corporation that has been dissolved 
for more than five years. The lawsuit is being prosecuted by one of The Travel Company's 
two former shareholders, Plaintiff William Hatton ("Hatton"). The Travel Company's other 
former shareholder, Wanda Hatton, former wife of William Hatton, is not a party to this 
suit. 
The action is founded upon Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants failed to properly 
account and pay for amounts due under an Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of Assets 
dated April 15, 1985 (the "Purchase Agreement") between Morris on the one hand and The 
Travel Company and William Hatton and Wanda Hatton on the other hand. The alleged 
breach of contract claims and demand for accounting belong solely to The Travel Company. 
Applicable Utah law, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989), permits a corporate action to be 
asserted by the corporation or its shareholders within two years of a corporation's 
dissolution. The Travel Company was involuntarily dissolved on October 1, 1987. The 
present action was filed more than five years after The Travel Company was dissolved and 
more than three years after the expiration of the corporate continuance period. 
H. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-100 (1989) IS A SURVIVAL 
STATUTE, NOT A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiffs argument that the corporate survival statute is a statute of limitation 
or that such statute may be displaced by a longer statute of limitations is erroneous. Utah 
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Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989) is a survival statute, not a statute of limitations. Unlike a 
statute of limitations, survival statutes extend the period to pursue claims otherwise 
extinguished by common law. Accordingly, Hatton must demonstrate that he has standing in 
1993, more than five years after The Travel Company's dissolution, to pursue this corporate 
claim. Unquestionably Hatton cannot do so. 
m . UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-100 IS NOT SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE 
TOLLING 
Hatton argues for equitable tolling of the statute. However, survival statutes 
are not subject to equitable tolling.1 E.g.. Canadian Ace Brewing v. Anheuser-Busch. Inc.. 
448 F.Supp 769, 771-72 (N.D.I11. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 444 
U.S. 884 (1979); Canadian Ace Brewing v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.. 629 F.2d 1183, 
1189 (7th Cir. 1980); Koepke v. First Nat'l Bank of DeKalb. 284 N.E.2d 671, 672 (111. Ct. 
App. 1972). 
Even if the Utah survival statute were somehow subject to "equitable tolling" that 
concept does not assist Hatton. Hatton has not alleged, nor has there been any fraudulent 
concealment, recent discovery of the present cause of action or any other equitable 
None of the cases Plaintiff cites support equitable tolling. See Midland Financial 
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue. 328 N.W.2d 866 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) 
(plaintiff "was not commencing an action. . . but was continuing administrative 
proceedings [by] instituting judicial review"); Striker v. Chester. 217 A.2d 31 (Del. 
1966) (dissolved corporation was realigned as a plaintiff party in an action originally 
filed before the corporation was dissolved in which the corporation was named as a 
defendant); North American Asbestos v. Superior Court of Alemeda County. 128 Cal. 
App.3d 138, 143 (1982) (a motion to dismiss rather than a motion to quash is the 
proper vehicle to assert the survival statute); and Moore v. Nick's Fine Foods. Inc.. 
460 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1984) (the rule permitting minors to bring an action within two 
years of reaching the age of majority "overrides" the corporate dissolution statute). 
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consideration which could possibly toll the two year dissolution period. See Brigham Young 
University v. Paulsen Const. Co.. 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987) (tolling occurs only in 
"exceptional circumstances" where application of a statute of limitations is irrational and 
unjust). 
Here, Hatton had full knowledge of the dispute with Morris before the wind-up period 
even began. Hatton's Decree of Divorce and property settlement in the divorce proceeding 
demonstrate that Hatton knew about the present dispute with Morris as early as January 21, 
1987 (eight full months before the Travel Company was involuntarily dissolved). Because 
Hatton has known about the current dispute and yet failed to fully prosecute such action for 
more than six years, he cannot now be heard to rely upon equitable principles. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE PREDISSOLUTION CLAIMS. 
Plaintiffs, in an attempt to escape the bar of the corporate continuance statute, 
have asserted a new theory on appeal, i.e., that their claims are postdissolution claims rather 
than predissolution claims and, therefore, not subject to the two year limitation period. 
Plaintiffs want this Court to ignore the allegations in their Complaint and their prior 
sworn acknowledgements in the Divorce Documents to the effect that; 
1) The disputed claims arose prior to May, 1986; 
2) By February 9. 1987. Hatton had acknowledged in the Divorce Agreement that 
the disputed claim of $241,000 in principal payments would only be realized, 
if at all, through litigation; 
3) The Divorce Agreement was entered into to provide for the manner in which 
the litigation would be funded and any proceeds distributed; 
4) In the Divorce Assignment, also acknowledged and attested to by Hatton on 
February 9. 1987. "Disputed Installments" were defined as those installments 
under the Morris Note that were to have been paid beginning on January 31, 
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1990 and continuing through April 30, 1990, in the total approximate principal 
amount of $241,000; 
5) In Plaintiffs' First and Second Causes of Action, they set forth that the 
principal balance owing under the Promissory Note and the Purchase 
Agreement is $240,704.38; 
6) In the Divorce Assignment the "Undisputed Installments" were defined as 
principal payments totalling $84,000. 
There is simply no question that Hatton knew, no later, than February 9, 1987, that 
the disputed principal amount of approximately $241,000 would only be recoverable through 
litigation. The Travel Company was not dissolved until nearly 8 months later, on October 1, 
1987. The claims asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint are all predissolution claims. 
Even if the claims were deemed postdissolution claims, Plaintiffs' Complaint would 
be dismissed. Postdissolution claims are not specifically addressed by statute; therefore, 
common law prevails and subsequent to the corporation's death, no claims in favor of the 
nonexistent corporation can arise. 
V. HATTON LACKS ANY INDEPENDENT BASIS UPON WHICH 
HE CAN SUE THE DEFENDANTS. 
Hatton asserts that even if the two year corporate dissolution statute applies, 
the statute bars only The Travel Company's claims and not Hatton's individual claims 
inasmuch as Hatton is a separate party to the Purchase Agreement. See Brief of Appellant, 
at 18. Hatton's argument is disingenuous. Hatton is not a party to the Promissory Note or 
entitled to payment under the provisions of the Purchase Agreement. 
The Complaint makes it clear that Hatton's purported individual claim is a recent 
creation designed to get around the corporate survival statute. See Appendix 5 (Summary of 
the Complaint's Substantive Allegations). That creation is defeated not only by the 
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Complaint but also the express terms of the Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement. 
Hatton is not a party to the Note or the Purchase Agreement provisions upon which recovery 
is sought. 
Hatton references his divorce settlement agreement for his authority to pursue the 
present action against Morris. Hatton's reliance upon the Divorce Settlement Documents and 
the Decree of Divorce is remarkable since those documents, when reviewed, directly refute 
Hatton's position that he has an individual claim. 
If the amounts allegedly owed by Morris were due Bill Hatton individually, then prior 
pleadings and representations to this Court in the 1988 Complaint filed by The Travel 
Company and the Divorce Settlement Documents were filled with false representations. In 
the 1988 Complaint, these identical claims were asserted and it was clearly represented that 
The Travel Company, not Bill Hatton, owns the claims. The Divorce Settlement Documents 
are filled with representations that the claims belong to The Travel Company and that 
William and Wanda Hatton only stand to gain from the claims as shareholders via a 
subsequent distribution from The Travel Company. Further, if allowed, Hatton's position 
would result in his being able to "individually" collect a corporate obligation without 
accounting to creditors who are subject to the bar of § 16-10-100. 
VI. HATTON'S CLAIM AS A SUCCESSOR SHAREHOLDER DOES NOT 
AVOID THE SURVIVAL STATUTE. 
Recognizing the inevitable, Hatton's final argument is that he may bring this 
claim as a successor to the corporation. Morris does not dispute that Hatton could have sued 
as a succeeding shareholder within the two year statutory period. However, the statute 
unequivocally applies to "the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders . . . ." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100. Hatton is thus barred from bringing suit against Morris. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH 
CORPORATE CONTINUANCE STATUTE. 
A. Introduction. 
Under common law, dissolution of a corporation "puts an end to its existence, 
the result may be likened to the death of a natural person." Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 
Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg.. 302 U.S. 120, 125 (1937). Consequently, "after a 
corporation is dissolved, it is incapable of maintaining an action; and all such actions pending 
at the time of dissolution abate, in the absence of a statute to the contrary." Id; see also 
Platz v. Intemat'l Smelting Co.. 213 P. 187, 190 (Utah 1922) ("The effect of a legal 
dissolution of a corporation is to do away with and terminate the legal entity. . . . If such be 
the legal effect of the dissolution, there was no legal entity at the time of filing. . . ."). That 
rule of law applies equally to shareholders or others who seek to assert claims either on 
behalf of or as assignees of corporate rights. See MBC. Inc. v. EngeL 397 A.2d 636, 639 
(N.H. 1979). 
Utah, consistent with many jurisdictions, ameliorated the common law rule by 
adopting the provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") in 1961. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-1 (1991) (Compiler's Notes). The MBCA provides for survival of 
corporate remedies as pursued by the corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders for a 
period of two years after dissolution. Because the survival statute extends the period to 
pursue claims otherwise extinguished by the common law, the terms of the statute must be 
strictly met for a claim to be pursued. See MBC. Inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 638 
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(N.H. 1979).2 The statute is not subject to equitable exceptions. Koepke v. First Nat'l Bank 
of DeKalb. 284 N.E.2d 671, 672 (111. Ct. App. 1972). 
B. The Utah Statute. 
The relevant Utah statute provides in part: 
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a 
certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code . . . shall not take away or impair any remedy 
available to . . . the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders. 
for any right or claim existing . . . prior to such dissolution if action or 
other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date 
of such dissolution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989) (emphasis added).3 
The undisputed facts are that The Travel Company and Hatton failed to pursue 
their claims within the two year time frame of the applicable Utah statute. The Travel 
Company was dissolved on October 1, 1987. (R. 74). Although Hatton and The Travel 
Company were obviously aware of the alleged claim and retained counsel to pursue 
collection within the two year period (See 1988 Complaint, (R. 77-98), that action was 
voluntarily dismissed by The Travel Company subsequent to Morris' tender of what it 
believed and asserted to be the remaining balance due on the Promissory Note. 
Supplemental Statement of Facts 1f 10. Now, more than five years after The Travel 
See also Chicago Title. 302 U.S. at 127-28 ("How long and upon what terms a state-
created corporation may continue to exist is a matter exclusively of state power. The 
circumstances under which the power shall be exercised and the extent to which it 
shall be carried are matters of state policy, to be decided by the State Legislature.") 
(citations omitted). 
Although Utah's Business Corporation Act was revised in 1992, section 
16-10a-1704 provides that the Act's revisions do not affect "the operation of [a] 
statute or any action taken under it before its repeal." 
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Company's dissolution, Hatton is seeking to reassert the same claim.4 
However, it is beyond dispute that the statute applies equally to The Travel Company 
and Hatton. By its terms, the statute bars "the corporation, its directors, officers, or 
shareholders, for any right or claim . . .[not] commenced within two years after the date of 
such dissolution." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989). The 1988 Complaint that was filed 
within the two year period was voluntarily dismissed. The present action is barred. The 
addition of Hatton as a named plaintiff does nothing to remedy the bar. Whether the 
decision to voluntarily dismiss the 1988 Complaint was a result of Morris' tender of what it 
believed to be the entire remaining amount due under the Promissory Note and the Purchase 
Agreement, which tender was accepted (Supplemental Statement of Facts, 1 11) or a result of 
bad advice or misunderstandings,5 the time to rethink the voluntary dismissal and the sagacity 
thereof is no longer possible if a legal remedy is sought, only if one wants to languish in 
seller's remorse, which Hatton seems prone to do, having brought the same action three 
times now over a 5 year period. 
Hatton filed a similar lawsuit in the Federal District Court of Montana on or about 
March 27, 1991. That lawsuit was dismissed based upon the absence of personal 
jurisdiction over Defendants. Just as here, Hatton had no standing to file that lawsuit 
since the winding up period for The Travel Company had expired a full year and a 
half earlier on October 1, 1989. 
While for purposes of this proceeding we accept as true Hatton's understanding that 
the 1988 Complaint was voluntarily dismissed because of his counsel's conflict of 
interest, such an understanding has no bearing on what the law or the procedural or 
ethical requirements are. If a party desires to pursue claims and employs counsel to 
file a complaint and that party's counsel thereafter announces a conflict of interest and 
the need to withdraw from the case, that party can simply have new counsel 
substituted in. Nothing in the law requires or even suggests the need to voluntarily 
dismiss the case under such circumstances. 
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H. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-100 (1989) IS A SURVIVAL 
STATUTE, NOT A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiffs argue that their action based upon the Promissory Note and the 
Purchase Agreement is timely within the six year contract statute of limitations. In addition, 
Plaintiffs claim that the two year statutory period of corporate dissolution is not applicable 
because courts prefer a longer statute of limitations when two such statutes apply. Brief of 
Appellant, at 10. Plaintiffs misapprehend the nature of the corporate survival statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989) is not a statute of limitations.6 "[Plaintiffs] 
incorrectly equate [] the corporate continuance statute with the statute of limitations." MBC. 
Inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 638 (N.H. 1979). "At common law, a corporation's capacity 
to sue and be sued terminated when the corporation was legally dissolved." Poliquin v. 
Sapp. 390 N.E. 2d 974 (111. Ct. App. 1979) (citing 16A W. Fletcher, Encyclopedia of 
Corporations. § 8142 (1975)). Unlike a statute of limitations, survival statutes extend the 
period to pursue claims otherwise extinguished by the common law. "The distinction is that 
a statute of limitations affects the time that a stale claim may be brought while a survival 
statute gives life for a limited time to a right or claim that would have been destroyed 
entirely but for the statute." Davis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 727 F.Supp. 549 (D. 
Plaintiffs' cases deal with selecting between two statutes of limitation. None support 
the argument that the corporate survival statute is a statute of limitation or that such 
statute may be displaced by a longer statute of limitation. See Juab County Dept. of 
Public Welfare v. Summers. 426 P.2d 1 (Utah 1967); Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden. 
188 P.2d 995 (Utah 1948); Thiel v. Taurus Drilling. Ltd.. 710 P.2d 33 (Mont. 1985); 
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Honeywell. Inc.. 639 P.2d 996, 1001 (Alaska 1981); Richards 
Engineering. Inc. v. Spanel. 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Woodward v. 
Chirco Constr.. Inc.. 687 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). 
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S.D. 1989) (citing Van Pelt v. Greathouse. 364 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Neb. 1985)). 
Hatton must therefore demonstrate both that his action is timely under the six year 
statute of limitations and that he has standing in 1993, more than five years after The Travel 
Company's dissolution, to pursue this corporate claim. Unquestionably Hatton cannot do so. 
m . HATTON'S "TOLLING" ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
A. Section 16-10-100 Is Not Subject To Equitable Tolling. 
Recognizing that this claim was filed more than three years too late, Hatton argues 
for equitable tolling of the survival statute. However, survival statutes are not subject to 
equitable tolling. E.g.. Canadian Ace Brewing v. Anheuser Busch. Inc.. 448 F.Supp. 769 
(N.D.ILL. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 884 (1979); 
Canadian Ace Brewing v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.. 629 F.2d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Koepke v. First Nat. Bank. 284 N.E.2d 671, 672 (111. Ct. App. 1972). 
In Canadian Ace Brewing v. Anheuser-Busch. Inc.. 448 F.Supp 769 (N.D.I11. 1978), 
affd. 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 884 (1979), the court dismissed an 
action by a dissolved corporation despite a contention that the plaintiff had been unaware of 
the defendant's acts as a result of fraudulent concealment. The court refused to apply 
fraudulent concealment as commonly applied to statutes of limitations because of the basic 
difference between a statute of limitation and a survival statute. IcL at 772. See infra 
Section II ("Unlike a statute of limitations, survival statutes extend the period to pursue 
claims otherwise extinguished by the common law"); see also Joseph Schlitz Brewing. 629 
F.2d at 1189 ("[s]ince the well-recognized purpose of survival statutes . . . is to provide a 
specific duration of time for a corporation to wind up its affairs and thus to set a specified 
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time when its existence is terminated, . . . extending th[at] period, by application of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel, would defeat the statute's purpose"); Koepke. 284 N.E.2d at 
671 (survival statute bars "an action brought in equity"). 
None of the cases cited by Plaintiffs support equitable tolling. Plaintiffs place great 
reliance on Striker v. Chesler. 217 A.2d 31 (Del. 1966). However, Striker and another case 
cited by Plaintiffs stand for the unremarkable proposition that if the action is commenced 
within the wind-up period, that action may be prosecuted to completion after the statutory 
period.7 The Utah statute expressly recognizes as much. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100. 
Plaintiffs also quote extensively from John J. Gamalski Hardware v. Baird. 299 N.W. 
757 (Mich. 1941) as quoted in Striker. Brief of Appellant at 14. However, the Michigan 
Supreme Court itself limited the 1941 Gamalski case to its unique replevin facts and held that 
a modern survival statute applies to bar a claim for recovery of money due under a contract. 
Dawn Construction Co. v. Paris Home Builders. Inc.. 103 N.W.2d 410 (Mich. 1960). The 
remaining two cases cited by Hatton are not remotely connected to these facts and do not 
support the notion that equitable tolling is appropriate.8 
7
 See Midland Financial Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue. 328 N.W.2d 866 (Wis, 
Ct. App. 1982) (where the plaintiff "was not commencing action. . . but was 
continuing administrative proceedings [by] instituting judicial review"); Striker v. 
Chesler. 217 A.2d 31 (Del. 1966) (where a dissolved corporation was realigned from 
a defendant to a plaintiff in an action originally filed before the corporation was 
dissolved). 
8
 In North American Asbestos v. Superior Court. 128 Cal. App.3d 138, 143 (1982), 
the court simply held that a motion to dismiss rather than a motion to quash is the 
proper vehicle to assert the survival statute. In Moore v. Nick's Finer Foods. Inc.. 
460 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1984), the court determined that the rule permitting minors to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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B. Hatton Can Recite No Facts To Support 
"Equitable Tolling". 
Even if the Utah survival statute were somehow subject to "equitable tolling," that 
concept does not assist Hatton. Hatton has not alleged, nor has there been any fraudulent 
concealment, recent discovery of the present cause of action or any other equitable 
consideration that could possibly toll the two year dissolution period. 
In Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Const. Co.. 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed equitable tolling in the context of a contract statute of 
limitations. The court held that tolling occurs only in "exceptional circumstances" where the 
application of a statute of limitations is irrational or unjust. IcL at 1374. In Paulsen, the 
plaintiff discovered a breach of contract approximately midway through the running of the 
statutory period. Because there was an opportunity to timely file, equitable tolling would not 
apply even to the period prior to discovery. Id. 
Here, Hatton had full knowledge of the dispute with Morris before the wind-up period 
even began. Hatton's Decree of Divorce and Divorce Settlement Documents demonstrate 
that Hatton knew about the present dispute with Morris prior to February 9, 1987 (nearly 
eight months before the Travel Company was involuntarily dissolved). Consequently, prior 
to January, 1988, The Travel Company retained counsel to collect these same monies 
allegedly owed under the Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement. See 1988 Complaint 
(R. 77-98). 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
bring an action within two years of reaching the age of majority "overrides" the 
corporate dissolution statute. 
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On or about February 1988, Morris tendered $92,933.03 as a final payment under the 
Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement. IcL 1 . Morris made it clear that no 
additional amounts were due and that no additional amounts would be paid. IcL 1 . 
As a result of Morris' position, The Travel Company filed a lawsuit (the "1988 
Complaint") on about June 30, 1988 in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, asserting these same claims. (R. 77-98). On or about August 3, 1988, 
however, The Travel Company voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit. Thereafter, no action was 
initiated by either Hatton or The Travel Company within the two year corporate dissolution 
period.9 
Because Hatton has known about the current dispute and yet failed to fully prosecute 
such action for more than six years, he cannot now be heard to rely upon equitable 
principles. 
C. Hatton. Bv His Own Act Or Failure To Act 
Allowed The Dissolution Of The Travel Company 
Plaintiffs' final argument in equity is to the effect that this Court is being asked to 
give its blessing to a potential abuse of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 where one company 
purchases another corporation, providing for a balloon payment for the purchase price three 
years down the road and then voluntarily dissolving the purchased corporation, avoiding any 
repayment. Brief of Appellant, at 16. Plaintiffs further suggest that in the case at hand, in 
Hatton makes reference to his having improperly filed a 1991 lawsuit in Montana as 
an "equitable" factor. Aside from the fact that the Montana lawsuit was ill conceived 
and Hatton voluntarily dismissed his appeal in that case under a threat of dismissal by 
the Ninth Circuit, the fact remains that the Montana action was filed approximately a 
year and one-half after expiration of the wind-up period. 
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spite of providing for payments through April 30, 1990, Morris purchased the name and all 
other assets of The Travel Company, thereby subsuming The Travel Company. Plaintiffs 
then conclude that this was the reason The Travel Company was dissolved, having no reason 
for a continuing existence. Brief of Appellant, at 15. These assumptions and conclusions 
are, of course, erroneous, legally incorrect and not supported by the record. 
First, Morris did not cause or require The Travel Company to dissolve. The 
dissolution was the result of the Plaintiffs' "failure to file an annual report." (R. ). 
Whether the result of a conscious decision or neglect, the dissolution occurred because of 
Plaintiffs' failure to act, not because of any actions of Morris. 
Second, the fact that a corporation sells its name and assets does not require a 
dissolution. It is a simple matter to amend articles of incorporation and change a corporate 
name. It is also a simple matter to continue a corporate existence by submitting an annual 
filing, even if you do not want to acquire new assets and continue to operate. 
Third, the record is clear that at the time of the Purchase Agreement, it was Hatton's 
intent to continue the corporation's existence. Whether this intent was motivated by tax 
considerations or future business considerations or otherwise does not matter. That the 
election to sell the assets rather than the stock of the company was Hatton's is clear from the 
Complaint. Paragraph 9 states that in or about December, 1984, Morris offered to purchase 
the stock or the assets of The Travel Company from the Hattons. Paragraph 10 then states 
that William Hatton negotiated with Morris the terms of sale of the assets of The Travel 
Company. (R. 3). Had Hatton decided to sell his stock instead, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-100 would not come into play. The purchase price would be due the selling 
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shareholder. Hatton, for whatever reason, negotiated the sale of the assets of The Travel 
Company, electing to have The Travel Company be the payee on the Promissory Note and 
the beneficiary under the Purchase Agreement. 
The intent of Hatton to keep the corporation alive is further evidenced by the 
following undisputed facts: 
(1) The sale of assets was consummated on April 15, 1985 (R. 23) and the 
dissolution did not occur until October 1, 1987 (R. 75); 
(2) The Divorce Assignment (Appendix 4) contemplated the filing of State and 
Federal tax returns "for fiscal years ending June 30, 1986 and June 30, 1987" and 
payment of those tax obligations. Divorce Assignment, 1 5. 
(3) Morris was ordered in the Decree of Divorce (Appendix 1) to tender all future 
amounts owed under the Morris Note and the Morris Agreement to The Travel 
Company, in care of Wanda Hatton's attorneys, Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown. 
Decree of Divorce, 1 10. 
(4) Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, The Travel Company retained its 
accounts receivable. Supplemental Statement of Facts, 1 12. 
(5) The Travel Company had ongoing responsibilities and commitments under the 
terms of the Purchase Agreement. See, e.g. 1 16 Survival of Representations and 
Warranties and 1 17 Further Assurances. Supplemental Statement of Facts, 1 13. 
(6) The Divorce Settlement Documents, under date of February, 1987 are filled 
with representations that the claims belong to The Travel Company. Appendixes 1 
3 and 4. 
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Fourth, this matter does not concern a note or balloon payment payable in the future. 
Whether appropriately labeled as anticipatory breach or an accord and satisfaction, the case 
u t j i a t w a s c | e a r | y defined ^ d known by the parties no 
later than April 9, 1987. See Divorce Agreement and Divorce Assignment. See also Section 
PIAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE PREDISSOLUTION CLAIMS. 
Plaintiffs in their i 
argument that their claims are postdissolution claims rather than predissolution claims and 
are, therefore, not subject to the two year corporate survival statute. Brief of Appellant at 
In the absence of finding supportive case law on point, Plaintiffs attempt to come in 
through the back door by using this Court 's holding in Hansen v. Dept. of Financial 
Institutions, 858 p 2 :! Il 84 ( ( ] \z I: i \ p p I  993) (Plaintiffs* c h in; i is v ei e predissolution claims 
and therefore subject to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100). Brief of Appellant at 16. 
mi v S i ill I k ' I I IK ill it 
Plaintiffs' claims are predissolution claims. The Travel Company was dissolved by the State 
of I Jtah on October 1, 198/ Plaintiffs, in their Complaint, state the following: 
"In or about May, 1986, Morris requested The Travel Company to 
agree to an adjustment in the promissory note." Complaint, t 33 
(emphasis added). (R. 6). 
Based on its own accounting, Morris claimed that it was entitled to a 
reduction in the promissory note of more than $200.000." Id., f 34. 
(R. 6) (emphasis added). 
Morris requested The Travel Company and the Hattons to sign 
amendment to the promissory note reflecting Morris ' claimed 
reduction. The claimed adjustment was not and has not been accepted 
by The Travel Company or its shareholders, the Hattons." Id., 1 35 
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(R. 6). 
Among the representations in the Divorce Agreement (Appendix 3), attested to by 
Hatton on February 9. 1987 we find the following: 
(1) "It may be necessary or advisable to litigate certain provisions of the 
Morris Note and the Morris Agreement (the 'Morris Litigation')." 
Divorce Agreement, t E. 
(2) "Travel Company Funds may not be used in the prosecution of the 
Morris Litigation absent join approval by Wanda and Bill." Id., H 2. 
(3) "If either Bill or Wanda declines to approve the use of Travel Company 
Funds or to advance Joint Funds for the Morris Litigation, the other 
may proceed with the Morris Litigation in the name of the Travel 
Company, using Individual Funds." Id., 1 4 (emphasis added). 
(4) "Bill and Wanda agree that either of them may retain an attorney to 
prosecute the Morris Litigation on a contingent fee basis . . . ." 
Id., 15 . 
(5) "Both parties must approve any settlement of the Morris Litigation 
before such settlement is binding." Id., 1 6. 
The entire Divorce Agreement is built around the litigation that must take place if the 
Travel Company is to ever realize the more than $200,000 reduction Morris had been 
claiming since May, 1986. 
Among the representations in the Divorce Assignment (Appendix 4), attested to by 
Hatton on February 9. 1987. we find the following: 
(1) "The Term 'Disputed Installments' shall mean and refer to those 
installments due under the Morris Note which Morris disputes, said 
installments falling due beginning on January 31, 1988, and continuing 
through April 30, 1990, in the total approximate principal amount of 
$241.000." Divorce Assignment, 1 1(c) (emphasis added). 
(2) "In the event litigation is commenced to recover the Disputed 
Installments from Morris, and such litigation is successful, the proceeds 
of such litigation shall be distributed first to litigation expenses." 
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Divorce Assignment, 1 3 (emphasis added). 
It is somewhat beyond coincidence that in Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action they set 
[iromissory note is $240,704.38", and that 
in their Second Cause of Action they set forth that "[t] he principal balance owing under the 
ase Agitr i i i int i V I I I 'III "' i r npl iint Hi '! * h hi" I I I I (HinrttHb, the 
disputed amount, which Morris had determined it was not paying, had been fixed and 
communicated long before the undisputed $84,295 62 principal payment was made in January 
or February, 1988. See Supplemental Statements of Facts, 11 10 & 11. See also Divorce 
Assignment, 1 1(b), for Hatton's definition of "Undisputed Installments," which, again 
beyond coincidence, he indicates consist of principal payments totalling $84,000. The 
disputed principal amount of $241,000 had been fixed and communicated no later than 
Febri la r ;; 9. 1 98 7, i lea i b 8 it i i 
Plaintiffs' claims are predissolution claims subject to the provisions of the corporate survival 
statute. 
Plaintiffs are not helped even if the claims were deemed to have arisen 
postdissolution. As stated in i Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations. 
§ 8141 at 433-34 (1988): 
Statutes that continue the corporation's existence for a period after 
dissolution for the prosecution of claims usually refer to claims existing 
at the time of dissolution. This does not mean that the statutory period 
—usually three years- does not apply as a limitation to claims that arise 
after dissolution; that is, that such claims may be brought even after the 
statutory period has expired. Rather, in the absence of coverage under 
the language of the statute, such claims revert to control by the 
common law, under which the corporation became extinct for all 
purposes upon dissolution. Therefore, a claim that arises after 
dissolution cannot be brought at all, much less brought in excess of the 
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statutory continuation period. 
V. HATTON LACKS ANY INDEPENDENT BASIS UPON WHICH 
HE CAN SUE THE DEFENDANTS. 
A. The Complaint Makes It Clear That Hatton 
Has No Individual Claim. 
Hatton asserts that even if the two year corporate dissolution statute applies, the 
statute bars only The Travel Company's claims and not Hatton's individual claims inasmuch 
as Hatton is a separate party to the Purchase Agreement between The Travel Company and 
Morris. See Brief of Appellant, at 18. Hatton's argument is disingenuous. Hatton is not a 
party to the Promissory Note or entitled to payment under the provisions of the Purchase 
Agreement. The fact that Morris' alleged obligations are owed only to The Travel Company 
is made crystal clear in the Complaint itself. Attached hereto as Appendix 5 is a summary of 
each substantive allegation made in Plaintiffs Complaint. Those allegations are consistent 
and unambiguous: the Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement provisions sought to be 
enforced are exclusively obligations allegedly owed to The Travel Company, not Hatton. 
After reading the Complaint, the only conclusion is that Hatton's purported individual claim 
is a recent creation designed to get around the corporate survival statute. 
That creation, however, is defeated by the Complaint and the express terms of the 
Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement. Hatton is not a party to the Promissory Note. 
Although Hatton is a party to the Purchase Agreement, he is a party only for the purpose of 
entering into a non-compete provision and providing representations and warranties regarding 
The Travel Company. See Complaint, 11 7 and 9. R. 3). Hatton is not a party to 
paragraph 1 of the Purchase Agreement which deals with the purchase of The Travel 
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Company's assets. Hatton is also not a party to paragraph 2, which sets forth the purchase 
price and payment terms of the Purchase Agreement. Paragraph 2 allocates $50,000 to 
.M . «n- .. :. Pnrap --'- • * ereement for 
which Hatton personally receives monetary consideration and there is no dispute but that he 
j t C l ( \ i 1 1 1 1 1 '(< 1 1 K ' I 1 " ! HI II i II I I I 1 1 i II i ) • • ) i ' - ) I i I I I I I in mi mi mi in in 1 in II I 1 1 mi • I <i I ui in I I I I 1 1 1 " " I mi I ( 1 1 1 " ui 1 1 i I I in in II in 
nor a party to paragraphs 1 & 2 of the Purchase Agreement he cannot individually bring an 
action on romissory Note or Purchase Agreement. 
Because he is not a party to the Promissory Note, Hatton asserts that he is a third 
party creditor beneficiary of the Promissory Note. Hatton's argument is not well founded in 
lav see Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah 1979) 
("even though a shareholder owns all, or practically all, of the stock in a corporation, such a 
corporation."). See also Hansen v. Green River Group. 748 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. 
the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear.") Nothing in 
the Note or Agreement demonstrate an intent to confer a separate benefit upon Hatton, 
monies payable under the Note are payable to The Travel Company, not Hatton.10 
10
 Hatton, realizing that in his shareholder capacity he has no claim as a third party 
beneficiary, argues that Morris, by its counsel's January 5, 1988 letter (R. 141-142), 
was somehow acknowledging that William Hatton and Wanda Hatton, other than in 
their capacity as shareholders, had individual claims to amounts due under the 
Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note. Besides not being helpful to Hatton since 
the language of the agreements itself must clearly set forth an intention to confer a 
separate and distinct benefit on a third party, the attempt to so cast the meaning of the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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In one last desperate attempt to revive his claims for a third "go-around," Hatton tries 
to piggy-back onto The Travel Company's claims under paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Purchase 
Agreement arguing that individual rights are granted to him with respect to all provisions of 
the Purchase Agreement by the boilerplate language of paragraph 19(b) (Brief of Appellant, 
at 19) which provides: 
(1) All of the terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of, and shall be enforceable by the heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors, legal representatives and assigns of Buyer, Seller and the Hattons. 
Approaching this language with Plaintiffs' logic would lead to the absurdity that 
Morris, by virtue of this paragraph, also has rights under all provisions of the Purchase 
Agreement meaning it would be both obligor and obligee under paragraphs 1 & 2. 
Paragraph 19(b) does no such thing. Its meaning is clear and well established. The rights of 
Hatton to the claims of The Travel Company devolve only because of his shareholder status 
which gives him no greater rights than the corporation under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100. 
B. The Divorce Documents Further Support The 
Absence Of An Individual Claim. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
letter is misrepresentative. For ease of review, the January 5, 1988 letter is included 
with this Brief as Appendix 2. In the first sentence of the second paragraph counsel 
for Morris states: "As you are aware, the payee under the Note is not William 
Hatton. but The Travel Company. Inc." Counsel for Morris then mentions how 
Morris was ordered, pursuant to William Hatton's and Wanda Hatton's Decree of 
Divorce to make payments under the note to Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown which 
firm, since the Decree, had been dissolved leaving it unclear to whom payment was 
now to be made. Not wanting to get caught in the crossfire of the divorce, counsel 
for Morris insisted that it receive joint instruction from Bill and Wanda Hatton, rather 
than complying with the demand of Jan Graham, who represented only William 
Hatton. No reading of the letter suggests that Morris "confirms" the legal conclusion 
that William and Wanda Hatton are creditor beneficiaries. 
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Hatton provides one paragraph of the Divorce Settlement Documents (R. 136) „. i 
convoluted attempt to show that he has ai 1 individual claii i i I latton 's reliance upon the 
Divorce Settlement Documents and the Decree of Divorce is remarkable since those 
documents directly refute Hatton's position that he has an individual claim. Consistent with 
lim iIIIIIirIMIiiin 1 ill lln ('nmpLiinl llim Mnnni Ai'nvmnil i null portinn nil «"i Iiin li I hlliim 
attached to his Memorandum in Opposition to Dismiss (R. 136), confirms the following 
" f a i l " . , "i villi in, in i III l i n t 1 m i l i l l ! mi1 in , ' ! i l l . i l l 1 1 . , h i ! . i n 1 s l i | i u L i U ill ih"" II! ' lii'ini", """I!": 
Bill and Wanda each own 50 percent of all of the authorized stock of a 
corporation known as the Travel Company. 
The Travel Company is the holder of a note receivable from Morris 
Travel Corporation (the "Morris Note") and the beneficiary of certain 
E It may be necessary or advisable to litigate certain provisions of the 
Morris Note and the Morris Agreement (the "Morris Litigation"), 
provisions in an agreement for the purchase and sale of assets betwe* 
and the Travel Company (the "Morris Agreement"). 
Divorce Agreement, f'f C Eh Appends -,K. _,W» .. Divorce 
Settlement Documents go on to state that the Promissory Note is executed by "Morris Travel 
Corporation in favor of The Travel Company" and reference is made to "payments to which 
iiic *.c*vi» ^oiiijj^ iifiiifn (lie iij'i'cniiiiiil ru'eiil'i/ I brlwcni Morns iin I 
The Travel Company , . ." IcL at 11(c) and 11(d) (emphasis added). Absolutely no 
r e h " n I IK "i i mi in in. mi In. 1 i i IM mi mi in I II mi mi i II i mi i in I  in i1 I  ill1 11 II II 11 in 11 iii - ' ' ' -
Further, the Divorce Settlement Documents require that proceeds obtained from 
Morm .i, i be paid to extinguish corporate tax obligations of The Travel Company, Divorce 
Assignment at 11 2 and J. ppendix 4. (R. 216-217). Finally, because The Travel 
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Company's shareholders disagreed over the merits of the claim,11 Travel Company funds 
could not be used to pursue the corporate claim except upon express agreement of the 
shareholders. Divorce Agreement at 1 2. The above representations resulted in a Decree of 
Divorce to "tender all future amounts owed under the Morris Note and Morris Agreement to 
The Travel Company, in care of [Wanda's] attorneys." Decree of Divorce, 1 10. (R. 243). 
The Divorce documents unequivocally refute rather than support Hatton's argument 
that he has an individual claim. 
C. The 1988 Complaint further confirms the derivative 
nature of Hatton's claims. 
In its 1988 Complaint, The Travel Company asserts these exact claims.12 At that 
time, it was specifically represented that The Travel Company, not Hatton, owned the 
claims: "Hatton, as the President of The Travel Company, and with the consent and 
approval of Wanda J. Hatton, brings this action in the name of The Travel Company." 1988 
Complaint at 1 67. (R. 86). Hatton's sudden right to sue "individually" is an artificial 
attempt to complete an end run around the corporate dissolution statute.13 Hatton's individual 
claims, at best, are based upon his shareholder status, thus making the 
11
 Wanda considered recovery against Morris to be "speculative at best." Wanda J. 
Hatton's Trial Memorandum, at 11 7 and 11. (R. 222-224). Wanda also candidly 
acknowledged the obvious: "[the] Note . . . was issued in favor of the couple's 
business, The Travel Company." IcL at 13. 
12
 The complaints are almost identical, with only a few edits in the present Complaint to 
the background facts. See Complaint 11 18, 20, 37, 41, 44, 45 and 67. (R. 4, 6, 7, 
8, 11). The claims themselves are identical. See First through Ninth Causes of 
Action of the Complaint (R. 10-19) and the 1988 Complaint. (R. 86-95). 
13
 As discussed above, the substantive allegations in the two complaints are identical 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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claims derivative in nature and subject to Uuiii Coue nun. § lo-iO-iGU M-g°), 
In addition, the implication of Hatton's sudden shift is very troubling for The Travel 
r 
against the corporation." Utah Code Ann. , k» ••• iOO(i^su). Thus, if allowed, Hatton's 
l H I S H I i n P I mi i i in in mi I mi! ii i ii mi i l l in H I I n in 1 I i»i» I n i i . 11.1 I
 c o r p 0 r a t e 05iigation without 
accounting to the corporation's creditors as a result of the bar now in place under 
§ 16 10 100 I ""i lew: to dissolution, those creditors would have had priority over the 
shareholders as specifically acknowledged in the Hattons' divorce settlement. See Divorce 
Assignment, 1 2 (requiring payment of corporate taxes before distributing Morris' 
individual claim theory.14 
IATTON'S CLAIM AS A SUCCESSOR SHAREHOLDER TO THE 
TRAVEL COMPANY DOES NOT AVOID THE SURVIVAL STATUTE. 
Recognizing the inevitable, Hatton's final argument is that he may bring this claim as 
a rris could have SUM I .i" i 
succeeding shareholder within the two year statutory period. However, the statute 
unequivocally applies to IIle corporation, its a;,., . . officers, or shareholders. " 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
with The Travel Company being consistently listed as the only party to whom 
obligations are owed. See Complaint. (R. 2-22), and 1988 Complaint (R. 77-98). 
14
 See e.g. Brangan v. United States. 373 F.Supp 1050, 1052 (E.D. Va. 1973) (party 
may not be discharged from liabilities and then pursue recovery of a claim not 
available to creditors); Snyder v. Routzahn. 55 F.2d 396, 396-97 (N.D. Ohio 1931) 
(same); Moore v. Slonim. 426 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D.Conn. 1977) (Same); In re 
Medley. 29 B.R. 84, 86 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (same). 
29 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100. Cases decided under the MBCA uniformly apply the statute 
to a corporation's shareholders. See MBC. inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 639 (N.J. 1979); 
Poliquin v. Sapp. 72 111. App.3d 477, 390 N.E.2d 974, 978 (1979); Koepke v. First Nat. 
Bank. 5 111. App.3d 799, 284 N.E.2d 671 (1972); Huston v. Fulgam Industries. 869 F.2d 
1457, 1461 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Oklahoma law); Canadian Ace Brewing v. Joseph 
Schlitz Brewing Co.. 629 F.2d 1183, 1187 (2nd Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law); 
Godeon v. Loew's Inc.. 147 F. Supp. 398, 408 (D. N.J. 1956), aff d on other grounds. 247 
F2d 451 (1974), disapproved on other grounds. New Jersey v. Morton Salt. 387 F.2d 94 
(3rd Cir. 1969).15 
The Engel Court declared emphatically: 
"We will not permit the corporation continuance statute to be circumvented by 
allowing former shareholders to assert expired rights of a defunct corporation 
after the statutory period has elapsed. The expired right is no more 
enforceable in the former shareholders' possession than it is in the defunct 
corporation's.... The former shareholder has no greater rights than the 
defunct corporation." MBC. Inc. v. Engel. supra. 397 p.2d 636, 639. 
The only circumstance where a shareholder may pursue an action after the statutory 
period is where the "claim has been reduced to a judgment prior to expiration of the 
statutory period. At that point, a "claim" no longer exists and the judgment, like 
other tangible property, passes to the shareholders as a fixed debt. Canadian Ace 
Brewing v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.. 629 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1980). The 
judgment represents a property interest and, therefore, an action to collect the 
judgment does not violate the policy of the statute to avoid a "continuous dribble of 
business activity contrary to the intent of the winding up provisions of the statute." 
MBC. Inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 639 (N.H. 1979) (citation omitted). Thus, Levy 
v. Liebling. 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956) is inapposite since that case concerns a 
judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
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Survival Statute on his claims. But no matter how hard he attempts to twist and turn or to 
pert on 111 v'lul iiiiiiM, Ilk1 Lis Is JM ' i/'l loi l l i in 111: • i"' tmpLmil, in llie I t ih luse Agreement, in llie 
Promissory Note, and in the Divorce Settlement Documents continue to haunt him. There is 
no way around the fact that his claims are derivative, at best. The Promissory Note is 
payable only to The Travel Company. The provisions of the Purchase Agreement dealing 
with the payments in dispute require payment to The Travel Company. Ihe Travel Company 
t i m e l y b r o u g h t 111 i i t j i r r i f u n l iiniii I 1 ' P Im l h i i i l i i n h i l i s m i s s n l nil Il in II II in mi ilillli Illiiiiiiiiiiill \\\ 
dismissal was a result of bad advice, a lack of advise, an evidence of an accord and 
to this case. What does matter is that if Hatton wanted to pursue the claims, he needed to 
Complaint prior to October I 1989 I laving failed to do so, those claims can no 
longer be pursued. The decision of the District Court should be affirmed. 
t£ DATED this ^/T .'.= of March, 1994. 
, x ; ^Wx/C, 
This R. James 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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on the following individual by placing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid, this 
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GORDON K. JENSEN 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE 
Attorneys for Appellants 
136 South Main Street, Suite 721 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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SALT LAKE COUNT; 
WANDA J. HATTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM A, HATTON and MORRIS 
TRAVEL CORPORATION, INC. 
Defendants . 
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J,Z tffi 
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t i v " i. f orme«i 
«li - T e e f r l e f e n d a n t 
»l,-jf h o r , n ' *"* *> , r n i ! P ' | " ' • 7 x 
* o p e r t y : 
(a) Lot and residence located at 4391 Adonis 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Adonis Property"); 
(b) A three-bedroom townhouse located in West 
Yellowstone, Montana, which is currently being rented to 
the local pharmacist for $400 per month, and upon which 
the monthly debt service obligation is $429 ("Townhouse 
#7"). 
3. Plaintiff is ordered to assume the mortgage 
encumbrances on the Adonis Property. Plaintiff shall 
commence making monthly debt service payments on the 
townhouse awarded to her in March, 1987, providing rent for 
that month is forwarded to plaintiff prior to the due date of 
payment. Defendant Hatton shall make all debt service 
payments on Townhouse #7 falling due before March 1, 1987. 
Defendant William A. Hatton is ordered to make appropriate 
arrangements to have all future rent payments for said 
townhouse transferred to plaintiff, and shall execute all 
appropriate and necessary documents to accomplish the 
transfer. 
4. Defendant William A. Hatton is awarded the following 
real property: 
(a) The real property and residence known as the 
Lake Hebgen Property, located on Lake Hebgen in the 
state of Montana; 
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savings, deposit and other banking accounts in his name or in 
the name of Silvercreek Property Management Corporation, all 
automobiles in his possession, 50% of all authorized Travel 
Company stock, 100% of the Silver Creek stock, and certain 
proceeds of the Morris Note and Morris Agreement as set forth 
hereinafter. 
8. There are certain proceeds of the Morris Note which 
are currently on deposit with the Court. There is also an 
installment of $50,000 plus interest due from Morris on 
January 31, 1987. The proceeds on deposit with the court and 
the payment which is due on January 31, 1987, plus all 
interest accrued on both of said payments shall be divided 
and paid as follows: 
(a) First, the joint obligation to First 
Interstate Bank in the approximate amount of $30,000 
shall be paid in full, including all interest accrued; 
(b) The next $40,000 shall be paid to plaintiff, 
to be used in whatever manner and for whatever purpose 
she deems appropriate; 
(c) The remaining balance shall be split one-half 
to plaintiff and one-half to defendant Hatton, each to 
utilize said funds in whatever manner and for whatever 
purpose they deem appropriate. 
9. The clerk of the court is ordered to tender a check 
representing all of the funds presently on deposit with the 
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. j t ^ a t i o n s a nd the rust : «* .iv ..',i * t i .p 
-ssis" determination and resolut' i 
ignature 
r .. :onsummate any transact i w espect 
^tprnun.v r^-iau .JAL'S w.tu, ,i«c parties shall 
mutually agree upon a reputable tax accountant employed by 
one of the MBig Eight" accounting firms, or a tax lawyer 
mutually agreeable to them, to handle calculation of 
corporate taxes due, negotiations with the Internal Revenue 
Service, and any potential liquidation or restructuring of 
The Travel Company, the Morris Agreement or the Morris Note 
which may be to the mutual advantage of the parties. 
12. All remaining amounts owed by Morris under the 
Morris Note and the Morris Agreement after satisfaction of 
all corporate tax liability, accounting and attorneys fees 
incurred in connection with the determination and resolution 
of the corporate tax liability, shall be split evenly between 
the parties, one-half to plaintiff and one-half to defendant. 
13. Any shortfall in funds to pay Travel Company 
corporate tax liabilities after application of the proceeds 
of the Morris Note and Morris Agreement and the earnings 
thereon shall be borne one-half by each party. 
14. Neither party may incur debt in the name of the 
Travel Company or encumber assets of the Travel Company 
without the prior written consent of the other. 
15. Plaintiff is awarded all outstanding Travel Company 
receivables other than the Morris Note, and is entitled to 
receive, collect and expend for her own use and benefit all 
such receivables, all at her own expense. 
16. Each party is ordered to bear his or her respective 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
17. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
18. Each party is ordered to determine and pay his or 
her respective personal tax obligations. 
19. All parties are ordered to execute such documents 
as are necessary to consummate the orders set forth in this 
judgment and decree of divorce. 
20. The decree of divorce entered herein shall be final 
upon entry. 
21. The orders entered in this case are without 
prejudice to the rights and claims, if any, by and between 
the Travel Company and its successors in interest, including, 
but not limited to, plaintiff and defendant Hatton, and 
Morris Travel Corporation and its successors in interest, as 
such rights and claims involve the collection or enforcement 
of the Morris Note and Morris Agreement. 
DATED this /£> day of February, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: /? 
Jara£s S < Sawaya ^ 
Third District Judge 
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THOMAS C KELLY 
January 5, 1988 
HAND DELIVERED 
Jan C. Graham 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dear Ms. Graham: 
Mark Slack of Morris/Ask Mr. Foster referred to me 
your letter of December 17, 1987. You indicate in that letter 
.that you have been retained by William A. Hatton in connection 
with the dispute over the obligations of Morris Travel 
Corporation (HMorristf) under the terms of that certain 
promissory note dated April 30, 1985 (the "Note"). 
As you are aware, the payee under the Note is not 
William Hatton but The Travel Company, Inc. William and Wanda 
Hatton recently were involved in divorce proceedings. Morris 
became entangled in these proceedings against its wishes and 
at considerable inconvenience and expense. The divorce decree 
that was eventually entered specifically required Morris to 
make payments under the note to Fox, Edwards, Gardiner and 
Brown, counsel for Wanda Hatton. 
Since the dissolution of Fox, Edwards, Gardiner and 
Brown, Morris has been in the difficult position of not 
knowing to whom payment should be tendered. Morris has taken 
the position that it will only tender payments upon joint 
instruction of Bill and Wanda Hatton, and has made efforts for 
months to receive such joint instructions. Your letter 
indicates that you have been retained by Bill Hatton but does 
not refer to Wanda Hatton. 
€*WU 
Jan C. Graham 
January 5, 1988 
Page 2 
Morris intends to promptly pay the entire 
balance that it believes is payable under the Note, 
of Morris, I hereby request joint instruction from 
Wanda Hatton (or from counsel representing both of 
how payment under the Note should be made. 
remaining 
On behalf 
Bill and 
them) as to 
you also request documentation 
attributable to The Travel Company 
r. Mark 
provide you that 
next week or so 
In your letter, 
relating to the revenues __ „
for all quarters through the end of the last quarte 
Slack has indicated that he should be able to  
information within the 
Morris welcomes the opportunity to attempt to resolve 
the dispute regarding amounts due under the Note as amicably 
as possible. After the quarterly information has been 
provided to you, and after you have had the opportunity to 
review other documentation, we would welcome the opportunity 
to meet with you to discuss Morris' position regarding this 
matter. 
me or 
If you have any questions, 
Rich Haddock of our office. 
please feel free to call 
Very truly yours, 
Thomas E. Kelly 
kr 
cc: Mark Slack 
APPENDIX NO. 3 
r 
AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is entered into by and between Wanda J- Hatton 
("Wanda") and William A. Hatton ("Bill") this day of 
February, 1987. 
This Agreement is based upon the following facts, which are 
not mere recitals, but which are stipulated to be true and which 
form an integral part of this Agreement: 
A. Bill and Wanda are husband and wife-
B. Bill and Wanda have agreed to the terms of a Decree of 
Divorce (the "Decree") and Assignment (the "Assignment") which, 
when fully executed, will sever their marriage and equitably 
distribute the real and personal property of the marriage* 
C. Bill and Wanda each own 50 percent of all of the 
authorized stock of a corporation known as the Travel Company, 
D* The Travel Company is the holder of a note receivable 
from Morris Travel Corporation (the "Morris Note") and the 
beneficiary of certain provisions in an agreement for the purchase 
and sale of assets between Morris and the Travel Company (the 
"Morris Agreement"). 
E. It may be necessary or adv i sables Jta..JLLtLga±e --.cental a 
provisions of the Morris Note and the Morris Agreement (the 
"Morris Litigation"), 
F. It is the desire of Bill and Wanda to set forth their 
agreement as to the manner in which the Morris Litigation should 
be conducted and funded. 
NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the parties' mutual 
agreement to the terms of the decree of divorce and the 
assignment, Bill and Wanda agree as follows: 
1. Dgfinitions* The following definitions shall govern the 
terms of this agreement: 
(a) The term "Travel Company Funds" shall mean and 
refer to funds which were originally owed to the Travel 
Company under the Morris Note or the Morris Agreement, which 
have not been actually distributed to Bill or Wanda, 
respectively. 
(b) The term "Individual Funds" shall mean and refer to 
any funds held individually by Bill or Wanda, respectively, 
from sources other than Travel Company Funds, or funds which 
were formerly Travel Company Funds, but which have become 
Individual Funds by reason of distribution to Bill or Wanda, 
respectively.
 C \ D E p~ s, T, 0N 
\ EXHjBlT 
(c) The term "Joint Funds" shall mean and refer to 
Individual Funds belonging to Bill and Wanda which they have 
contributed to the prosecution of the Morris Litigation, 
irrespective of the percentage attributable to each party. 
(d) The term "Contingent Fee" shall mean and refer to a 
contractual agreement with an attorney for the prosecution of 
the Morris Litigation wherein the attorney's fee is 
contingent upon the successful outcome of the litigation, and 
is limited to a percentage of the proceeds of successful 
litigation. 
2. Conduct of Litigation with Travel Company Funds. Travel 
Company Funds may not be used in the prosecution of the Morris 
Litigation absent joint approval by Wanda and Bill. This 
prohibition shall extend to the amount of the expenditure as well 
as the fact of the expenditure. If Travel Company Funds are used 
to fund the Morris Litigation, the proceeds, if any, of th^ fc 
litigation, shall be distributed according to the terms of tHe 
Decree and the Assignment. 
3. Conduct of Litigation with Joint Funds. Joint Funds may 
not be used in the prosecution of the Morris Litigation absent 
joint approval by Wanda and Bill. This prohibition shall extend 
to the amount of the expenditure as well as the fact of the 
expenditure. In the event the Morris Litigation is successful, 
and has been funded with Joint Funds, each party shall be entitled 
to a return of the amounts advanced prior to any distribution. 
Thereafter, the proceeds shall be distributed pursuant to the 
Decree and the Assignment. In the event the Morris Litigation is 
funded with joint funds and it is not successful, each party shall 
bear his or her own losses, and there shall be no right of 
contribution. 
4. Conduct of Litigation with Individual Funds. If either 
Bill or Wanda declines to approve the use of Travel Company Funds 
or to advance Joint Funds for the Morris Litigation, the other may 
proceed with the Morris Litigation in the name of the Travel 
Company, using Individual Funds. In the event the Morris 
Litigation is successful, and has been funded with Individual 
Funds, the party advancing Individual Funds shall be entitled to a 
return of the amounts advanced prior to any distribution. 
Thereafter, the proceeds shall be distributed pursuant to the 
Decree and the Assignment. In the event the Morris Litigation is 
funded with Individual Funds and is not successful, the party 
advancing Individual Funds shall bear his or her own losses and 
there shall be no right of contribution. 
5. Conduct of Litigation Under Contingent Fee Agreement. 
Bill and Wanda agree that either of them may retain an attorney to 
prosecute the Morris Litigation on a contingent Eee basis, 
providing the contingent fee does not exceed 33 1/3 percent, plus 
costs. In the event the Morris Litigation is pursued pursuant to 
this paragraph, and is successful, all proceeds after payment of 
- 2 '-
attorneys fees and costs shall be distributed pursuant to the 
terms of the Decree and the Assignment. In the event the Morris 
Litigation is pursued under this paragraph and is unsuccessful, if 
the parties have jointly retained counsel, they shall bear the 
costs 50-50; if one or the other has retained counsel on a 
contingent fee basis independent of the other, that party shall 
bear the costs alone, and there shall be no right of contribution. 
6. Settlement; Cooperation. Both parties must approve any 
settlement of the Morris Litigation before such settlement is 
binding. Bill and Wanda each agree that his/her consent shall not 
be unreasonably withheld. Bill and Wanda further agree that each 
will cooperate with the other in the conduct of the Morris 
Litigation, and in the furnishing of records, testimony and such 
other assistance as may be reasonably necessary. 
7. Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire 
agreement of the parties with respect to the subjects addressed 
herein, and may not be modified or altered except in a writiKg 
signed by both parties. 
8. 
retain an 
Attorneys Fees. Should either party be required to 
attorney to enforce the provisions of this Agreement, 
irrespective of whether litigation is commenced, said party shall 
be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and expenses incurred in 
enforcement of this agreement. 
DATED this day of February, 1987. 
Wanda J. Hatton 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of , 1987, personally appeared 
before me Wanda J. Hatton, the signer of the foregoing Agreement, 
who duly acknowledged to me that she had read and executed same, 
and that the contents thereof are true and correct of her own 
personal knowledge. 
My Commission expires 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
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STATE OF L/'} *~ ) 
COUNTY OF 
On this ? day of fa- u'i>?^y t 1987, pe^ GOfwrirlry appeared 
before me William A. Hatton, the signer of the foregoing 
Agreement/ who duly acknowledged to me that he had read and 
executed same, and that the contents thereof are true and correct 
of his own personal knowledge. ~ 
My Commission expires: 
<r/*7Q lc~ Notary Public ^ / 'J , T /•-Q / *'< / w Residing at: (*Sf A ^ 6^^V 
, / _ ^ 
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APPENDIX NO. 4 
5. 
ASSIGNMENT 
This Assignment is entered into between William A. Hatton 
("Bill") and Wanda J, Hatton ("Wanda") this day of February, 
1987. 
This Assignment is based upon the following facts, which are 
not mere recitals, but which are stipulated to be true and form an 
integral part of this Assignment: 
A,. Bill and Wanda are formerly husband and wife. 
B. Bill and Wanda have agreed to the terms of a Decree of 
Divorce which, when fully executed, wi^l sever their marriage and 
equitably distribute the real and personal property^ot the 
marriage. 
C. On January 21, 1987, pursuant to a stipulation between 
the parties, Bill and Wanda were divorced. 
D. As part of the Decree of Divorce, Bill has agreed to 
execute this Assignment in favor of Wanda. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of Wanda's agreement to the 
terms of the Decree of Divorce, and in compliance therewith, Bill 
agrees as follows: 
1. Definitions. The following definitions shall govern the 
terms of this Assignment: 
(a) The term "Morris Note" shall mean and refer to that 
certain promissory note executed by Morris Travel Corporation 
in favor of the Travel Company on or about May 1, 1985, in 
the face amount of $700,000. 
(b) The term "Undisputed Installments" shall mean and 
refer to the installments which Morris concedes it owes under 
the Morris Note, with interest, said installments being due 
on the following dates and in the following amounts: April 
30, 1987 ($25,000 plus interest); July 31, 1987 ($25,000 plus 
interest); October 31, 1987 ($25,000 plus interest); January 
31, 1988 ($9,000 plus interest). 
(c) The term "Disputed Installments" shall mean and 
refer to those installments due under the Morris Note which 
Morris disputes, said installments falling due beginning on 
January 31, 1988, and continuing through April 30, 1990, in 
the total approximate principal amount of $241,000. 
f I A 
(d) The term "Earn Out Payments" shall mean and refer 
to the payments to which the Travel Company may be entitled 
under paragraph 3 of the agreement executed between Morris 
and the Travel Company on or about April 15, 1985, 
2. Assignment of Undisputed Installments. The Decree of 
Divorce requires that the Undisputed Installments together with 
all the earnings thereon be deposited with an escrow to satisfy 
Travel Company corporate tax obligations. To the extent there is 
any surplus remaining after the Undisputed Installments and 
earnings thereon have been applied to Travel Company corporate tax 
obligations, Bill hereby irrevocably assigns to Wanda any interest 
he may have in the first $50,000 of such surplus, if any. After 
payment of said $50,000 to Wanda, the remaining proceeds of 
Undisputed Installments# if any, shall be divided evenly between 
Bill and Wanda. 
3. Assignment of Disputed Installments. In the event 
litigation is commenced to recover the Disputed Installments from 
Morris, and such litigation is successful, the proceeds of such 
litigation shall be distributed first to litigation expenses. To 
the extent of any surplus after the payment of litigation 
expenses, Bill hereby irrevocably assigns to Wanda any interest he 
may have in the first $50,000 of any such surplus, less any 
amounts Wanda has received pursuant to the assignment of 
Undisputed Installments under paragraph 2 hereof. After Wanda has 
received a total of $50,000 from the surplus, if any, of 
Undisputed Installments and Disputed Installments, the remaining 
proceeds of Disputed Installments, if any, shall be divided evenly 
between Bill and Wanda. 
4. Assignment of Earn Outs. All Earn Outs earned by the 
Travel Company under the Morris Agreement shall be applied first 
to Travel Company corporate tax obligations. To the extent there 
is any surplus of- Earn Outs after payment of Travel Company 
corporate tax obligations, Bill hereby irrevocably assigns to 
Wanda any interest he may have in the first $50,000 of such 
surplus, less the amounts Wanda may have previously received from 
the surplus of Undisputed Installments and Disputed Installments, 
up to a total of $50,000. After Wanda has received a total of 
$50,000 from the surplus, if any, of the Undisputed Installments, 
Disputed Installments, and Earn Outs, the remaining proceeds, if 
any, of the Earn Outs shall be divided evenly between Bill and 
Wanda. 
5. Presentment to Morris. Bill agrees that Wanda is 
entitled to present this Assignment to Morris, and that such 
presentment shall entitle Morris to tender all payments owed under 
the Morris Note and the Morris Agreement to the trust account of 
Fox, Edwards, Gardiner and Brown ("FEGB") for distribution 
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pursuant to the terms of this Assignment. Bill and Wanda agree 
that upon presentment of signed and completed state and federal 
corporate tax returns for the Travel Company showing the corporate 
taxes owed for fiscal years ending June 30f 1986 and June 30r 
1987, and evidence of payment of those obligations to the 
appropriate state and federal taxing authorities, FEGB is entitled 
to distribute all Disputed Funds and Earn Outs as set forth 
herein. Bill and Wanda agree that the services of FEGB shall be 
compensated from funds deposited with it at the normal hourly 
rates of the attorneys handling the distribution of funds. In the 
event of a dispute as to who is entitled to the Disputed Funds and 
Earn Outs, FEGB shall be entitled to initiate an interpleader 
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
deposit the moneys held by it with the clerk of the court, and be 
absolved of any further obligation relating to said funds. Bill 
and Wanda further agree that all costs and attorneys fees incurred 
by FEGB in any such interpleader action shall by paid from the 
funds deposited with the clerk of the court. 
6. Entire Agreement. This agreement contains the entire 
agreement of the parties with respect to the subjects addressed 
herein, and may not be modified or altered except in a writing 
signed by both parties. 
7. Attorneys Fees. Should either party be required to 
retain an attorney to enforce the provisions., of this Assignment, 
irrespective of whether litigation is commenced, said party shall 
be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and expenses incurred in 
enforcement of this Assignment. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
WANDA J. HATTON 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF 
i//>L ) 
ss 
(f</r^c>^y On this 7 day of ^
before me William A, Hatton, the 
Assignment, who duly acknowledged to 
executed same, and that the contents thereof 
of his own personal knowledge* 
My Commission expires: 
1987, pet'-^ tttrirty appeared 
signer of the foregoing 
me that he had read and 
are true and correct 
Notary Public 
Residing at: ~C^7Z /L C^Ao^S*? 
~7 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
1987/ personally appeared On this day of 
before me Wanda J. Hatton, the signer of the foregoing Assignment, 
who duly acknowledged to me that she had read and executed same, 
and that the contents thereof are true and correct of her own 
personal knowledge. 
My Commission expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
APPENDIX NO. 5 
EXHIBIT A 
Plaintiffs' Substantive Allegations 
BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS 
i[12 "In April 1985 an agreement was reached for 
purchase by Morris of the assets of The Travel Company." 
H14 "Morris agreed to pay The Travel Company 
$700,000 for its assets," 
K15-16 "Morris [paid] $200,000 at the closing 
. . . [and the] balance of the purchase price ($500,000) was 
evidenced by a promissory note [attached as Exhibit B which is 
payable only to The Travel Company]." 
f43 "In addition to the $700,000 purchase price 
. . . Morris agreed to pay certain monies to The Travel 
Company in consideration of the purchase of its assets." 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Promissory Note) 
K70 "Pursuant to the terms of the promissory note, 
Morris is in default of its obligations to The Travel 
Company." 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Purchase Agreement) 
H75 "Pursuant to the terms of the Purchase 
Agreement, Morris is in default of its payment obligations to 
The Travel Company." 
A-l 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Implied Duty Arising Out of Purchase Agreement) 
K82 "The Travel Company is entitled to an order 
. . . compelling Morris to account." 
K8 3 "The Travel Company is also entitled to recover 
all its costs." 
K84 "The Travel Company is entitled to receive 
payments [as a result of an accounting]• 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement) 
^90 "Pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note 
and Purchase Agreement, The Travel Company is entitled to 
recover all such court costs and expenses." 
FIFTH-EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION 
(Guarantees) 
11193,97,101,105 "[Guarantor] is absolutely and 
unconditionally liable to The Travel Company for eleven 
percent of all monies due and payable under the Purchase 
Agreement and the Promissory Note." 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Accounting) 
1114 "The Travel Company is entitled to an accounting 
by Morris." 
BG5/acbd 
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